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INSURANCE FOR CERCLA CLAIMS: THE PREMIUM
PAYS FOR WHAT?
by Gerald M. Levine*
I. Introduction
Unless one has a garden-variety
claim, insurance coverage is not
always certain. So, the question in
the title of this Article could apply
to automobile and homeowner pol-
icies purchased by the ordinary
consumer as well as to the compre-
hensive general liability policies
purchased by all levels of business
consumers, including the largest
corporations. At the heart of all
coverage disputes is a disagree-
ment about the meaning of words.
It need hardly be said that the
creation of meaning is a heavy
burden and that clear writing in-
volves effort.
This Article discusses the twin
questions of text and context. It
will focus on the language of the
comprehensive general liability
("CGL") policy, although what is
said about it is equally applicable
to other kinds of policies as well.
The Comprehensive Environmen-
tal Response, Compensation, and
Liability Act of 1980, amended by
the Superfund Amendments and
Reauthorization Act of 1986
("CERCLA")' created significant
new liabilities for a magnitude of
costs so substantial as to tax even
the largest corporate consumers.
II. The Creation Of Insurance
Policies
Discovering meaning in texts is
one of the principal intellectual
occupations that judges are called
upon to perform. Textual analysis
of statutes and contracts concerns
itself with examining the expres-
sive substance of human interac-
tion, cooperation and agreement.
Statutes and contracts, distinct in
every other way, are alike in that
they are constructed with words
chosen for a purpose. Indeed, the
process of creating text implies
that an author has worked pur-
posefully with language and ar-
rangement to most nearly express
the author's intention. The same is
true regarding the drafting of insur-
ance policies and documents.
Converting intention to text in-
volves making choices, which re-
quires a degree of foresight and
judgment. It is not surprising,
therefore, that a substantial
amount of judicial energy should
be involved in determining what
drafters, whether lawmakers or in-
dividuals, meant by their choices.
It should be equally unsurprising
that the parties who chose the
words are, in courts of law and
other forums, held to be responsi-
ble for the consequences of not
saying what they mean. As Lord
Mansfield said: "[miost of the dis-
putes in the world arise from
words." '2
Converting intention to text
involves making choices,
which requires a degree of
foresight and judgment.
Generally, social documents
come into being through a form of
dialogue known as negotiation,
which takes place between parties
with differing interests. It is impor-
tant to recognize the cultural and
societal benefits of dialogue. It
presupposes both an attitude and
an aptitude. It is the human means
by which parties are able to reach a
resolution, not necessarily from
discord to concord, but to agree-
ment, even if reluctantly achieved.
What dialogue involves is testing
and weighing words, choosing
among alternatives and, ultimate-
ly, matching words with intent.
While the creation of standard
insurance policies certainly in-
volves dialogue within the indus-
try,3 the finished policies are of-
fered to consumers on a take it or
leave it basis. Like other contracts,
the parties must live with the
choice of words made by the draft-
er of the contract. In insurance
disputes there is a well settled
principle that ambiguities are con-
strued against the insurer. One
court has stated that "if the con-
trolling language supports two
meanings, one favorable to the
insured, and the other favorable to
the insurer, the interpretation sus-
taining coverage must be ap-
plied."4 However, before this prin-
ciple can be invoked the language
in dispute must be analyzed to
determine whether it is ambiguous.
Apparently, words in insurance
policies that are clear and certain
to some are ambiguous to others.
Some courts have taken the view
that disagreements amongjurisdic-
tions about the meanings of words,
or different definitions in compet-
ing dictionaries, confirm the argu-
ment for ambiguity 5 Others take
the position that it is not merely
definitions but context which de-
termines meaning. 6 When parties
litigate over words and courts at
different levels and in different
jurisdictions agree or disagree with
each other's constructions, they are
engaging in a dialogue which, in
some respects, is a substitute for
the negotiation that insured parties
and insurers never had.
As will be discussed later,7 there
is a discordance among jurisdic-
tions about the meaning of certain
words and phrases, even though it
is generally agreed that the terms of
an insurance policy should be ac-
corded their natural and reason-
able meaning. For the parties, the
financial stakes are high. A holding
that certain words and phrases are
ambiguous favors the insured be-
cause it enlarges coverage, while
the reverse restricts it. s
III. The Meaning Of The Word
"Insurance"
Insurance is a risk contract. 9 The
type of risk drives the premium.
Consumers in the market for insur-
ance want security that should
(continued on page 84)
*Gerald M. Levine received his B.A. from the
University of California, Berkeley, his Ph.D.
from New York University, and his J.D.from
Brooklyn Law School. He is a partner in the
New York law firm of Calotta, Levine &
Samuel where he specializes in Real Estate,
Environmental Law and Intellectual Proper-
ty Law.
Volume 4 Number 3/Spring, 1992 83
Loyola Consumer Law Reporter
CERCLA Claims
(continued from page 83)
there be an occurrence'0 for which
they have purchased a policy, their
losses will be made whole and their
liabilities will be indemnified. The
Oxford English Dictionary does
not record any use of the word
insurance, in the sense of security
against risk of loss or indemnifica-
tion against exposure to liability,
before the 17th century."1
However, it is certain that insur-
ance was available before that time
since there was a late Elizabethan
statute which established a Court
of Policies of Assurance.' 2 The
statute recites the immemorial use
of policies of assurance in England
"by means whereof it cometh to
pass, upon the loss or perishing of
any ship, there followeth not the
undoing of any man, but the loss
lighteth rather easily upon many
than heavily upon few."' 3 A seven-
teenth century definition of insur-
ance emphasizes that during the
"time of the risque" losses or dam-
ages must be "with out ... fault of
the insured, [and] by unavoidable
accidents."' 4 Generally speaking,
"intentional," which is equivalent
to "fault" in this context, is the
opposite of "accidental."' 5
Consumers of insurance want to
be sure that the premiums they pay
will protect them from particular
enumerated risks which they hope
will not happen. However, insur-
ance is a particularly litigious area
of the law and insured parties do
not always find the security they
are seeking. Indeed, the reverse
may even be true. The dockets are
filled with examples of insurers
disclaiming liability and insured
parties and insurers suing for de-
claratory judgment.
IV. CERCLA
Among the most contentious in-
surance issues today are those con-
cerning coverage for environmen-
tal claims under CERCLA.16 One
court has noted that the area of
CERCLA claims is "a genre of
litigation that has become a staple
of many federal courts' dockets."' 7
The reason for such litigiousness is
the financial magnitude of cleaning
up hazardous waste sites.
There is disagreement not only
about the type of notice that trig-
gers the duty to defend against
government actions, but whether
there is coverage. If there is cover-
age, disagreement ranges from its
extent, as, for example, whether
CERCLA response costs are "dam-
ages," to the distribution of the
burdens of proof. On the issue of
type of notice, disagreement re-
volves around the meaning of the
word "suit."
Ultimately, the disagreements
center on the direct and specific
meaning of the text because in
even the most specific textual dis-
putes, there is room for legitimate
inference about the implied mean-
ing of words. If "damages" is read
to exclude response costs and an
insurer's liability is only for "dam-
ages," then insured parties would
be responsible for paying the first,
and most substantial, expenses on
any hazardous waste site. Deter-
mining the meaning of words thus
... the disagreements
center on the direct and
specific meaning of the text
because in even the most
specific textual disputes,
there is room for legitimate
inference about the implied
meaning of words.
carries a significant economic bur-
den either for insured parties or
insurers. 1
V. What Constitutes A "Suit"
Invoking A Duty To Defend
Disagreement about the mean-
ing of insurance policies begins as
early as the insurer receives notice.
The standard CGL provides that
the insurer shall have "the right
and duty to defend any suit against
the insured seeking damages on
account of ... property damage."' 9
The word "suit" is defined in
Webster's Third New Internation-
al Dictionary as "an attempt to
gain an end by legal process. '20
Ordinarily, claims are announced
by the service of a summons and
complaint. Typically, an insurer's
involvement is triggered by this
service of process. The question
then becomes whether an action
short of a legal process can consti-
tute a suit. If an action short of a
legal process can constitute a suit,
then it must be determined what
kind of action and notice is neces-
sary to accomplish this.
Disagreement about the
meaning of insurance
policies begins as early as
the insurer receives notice.
These questions are imperative
because frequently it is from let-
ters, not from summonses and
complaints, that parties learn of
government demands and posi-
tions. Indeed, letters can trigger a
process 21 that has significant ad-
verse consequences for a potential-
ly responsible party ("PRP") 22 as
that term is defined under CER-
CLA and comparable state laws.
Whether a letter is a "suit"
depends upon whether the govern-
ment's language is sufficiently co-
ercive or adversarial. The dividing
line is not easily discernible and
requires close textual analysis. The
insurer's duty to defend is only
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triggered if the letter crosses a
threshold. It is not enough for the
government simply to demand that
a PRP respond. Most letters re-
quest voluntary action, yet volun-
tary action is precisely what an
insured cannot take, for the rea-
sons discussed below.23 Courts pay
particular attention to the conse-
quences if a PRP fails to act on the
governmental notice. The issue has
been examined in a number of
federal and state cases and a con-
sensus is forming about the kind of
language notices must contain if
they are to qualify as "suits. '24
For an insured to have a right to
compel an insurer to defend and
indemnify, it must avoid taking
"voluntary" action. The CGL con-
tains a standard clause which is
part of the cooperation provision:
"The insured shall not, except at
his own cost, voluntarily make any
payment, assume any obligation or
incur any expense other than for
first aid to others at the time of the
accident. ' 25 Insured parties, par-
ticularly small property owners
and operators, are confronted by a
dilemma: on the one hand, they
dare not take voluntary action and,
on the other, if insurers do not
participate in settlement, the PRPs
cannot possibly meet the crippling
expense of incurred and projected
cleanup costs for a site.
Insured parties... are
confronted by a dilemma:
on the one hand, they dare
not take voluntary action
and, on the other, if insurers
do not participate in
settlement, the PRPs
cannot meet the expense of
incurred and projected
cleanup costs...
The problem of an insured tak-
ing voluntary action is brought
into sharp focus by a Massachu-
setts case, Augat, Inc. v. Liberty
Mut. Insurance Co.26 The case in-
volved the failure of a water treat-
ment system which resulted in a
discharge of contaminated water
into the local sewer system and the
ground at the site. The Common-
wealth presented Augat with a
complaint. Augat did not give no-
tice to its insurer at that time but
consented to the entry of judgment
and agreed to decontaminate the
site at its own expense. Only after it
had incurred cleanup costs exceed-
ing one million dollars did it give
the insurer notice of the judgment.
The insurer disclaimed and Augat
commenced an action for declara-
tory judgment.
Augat contended that its con-
sent to judgment was not voluntary
but was coerced by the threat of a
more costly verdict. It contended
further that it was presented with a
"Hobson's choice": it could either
accept the offered settlement or
risk paying treble damages result-
ing from a suit.27 To resolve the
dispute the court turned to Web-
ster's Third New International
BOOKS ON
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The New York Times re-
cently recommended the fol-
lowing books to help consum-
ers with personal financial
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The Complete Financial
Guide to the 1990's by Gary
L. Klott, published by Times
BookslRandom House
($22.50). This all-purpose fi-
nance book covers several
topics including paying for
college and retirement, taxes,
real estate, borrowing, and
investing.
The Dean Witter Guide to
Personal Investing by Robert
M. Gardiner, published by
NAL books ($4.99). The au-
thor provides basic explana-
tions for a variety of invest-
ments.
The Bond Fund Advisor by
Werner Renberg, published
by Dearborn Financial Pub-
lishing ($24.95). This book is
about bond funds, the most
popular of the mutual funds.
"Brushing up on Finance,"
N.Y. Times, May 16, 1992 at
16.
Dictionary for the meaning of
"voluntary" and concluded that
Augat's decision was "voluntary"
from the dictionary definition.28
The word is defined as" 'by an act
of choice' " or " 'not constrained,
impelled, or influenced by anoth-
er.' "29
The court held that alternatively
Augat could have demanded that
Liberty Mutual defend the claim
and assume the obligation to pay
for the cleanup. Although Augat's
decision was not "voluntary" in
the sense of "spontaneous" or un-
influenced, it was "voluntary" in
the sense of "by an act of
choice. ' 30 In retrospect, it seems
obvious that Augat should have
immediately put the insurer on
notice, but it was clearly less obvi-
ous in prospect.
To understand the "Hobson's
choice" that an insured must face,
consider the language of two no-
tices received by the Hazen Paper
Company, one from the United
States Environmental Protection
Agency ("EPA") and the other
from the Massachusetts Depart-
ment of Environmental Quality
Engineering ("DEQE"). 3' The no-
tice from the EPA read that the
EPA had determined there were
actual releases of hazardous sub-
stances at Hazen's facility. The
EPA was prepared to spend public
funds on "activities in response to
these releases" and to contract for
the "longer term phases of clean-
up of the site ... unless EPA deter-
mines that such action will be done
properly by a responsible party." 32
In this connection the EPA wished
to discuss Hazen's "voluntary in-
volvement in the measures neces-
sary to remedy the problems pre-
sented by the hazardous substances
[at the site]." '33
The court found the EPA letter
was analogous to a complaint be-
cause the letter stated that "the
only form of voluntary involve-
ment" that the EPA would consid-
er was an implementation of all the
measures described in the letter,
including the reimbursement of
expenses incurred by the EPA and
the DEQE. The court concluded
that the litigation defense protec-
tion that Hazen purchased from
the insurer "would be substantially
(continued on page 86)
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compromised if [the insurer] had
no obligation to defend Hazen's
interests in response to the EPA
letter." 34
However, the letter to Hazen
from the DEQE had a different
tone. That letter "claim[ed] only a
threat of the release of hazardous
material from certain 'overpacked
drums' temporarily stored on the
... site." 5 The court recognized
that the insured risked substantial
prejudice through EPA enforce-
ment procedures unless it aceded
to the EPA's invitation, despite the
DEQE's less demanding request.
The DEQE's request would have
been a voluntary action but Hazen
could not accede to this voluntary
action without losing its coverage.
A coercive letter from a state
environmental agency was the sub-
ject of Avondale Industries, Inc. v.
Travelers Indemnity Co.3 6 In A von-
dale, the court held that a notice
from the office of the Attorney
General of Louisiana issued at the
request of the Louisiana State De-
partment of Environmental Quali-
ty ("DEQ") was coercive and ad-
versarial. The letter notified
Avondale of the DEQ's intention
"to take immediate action to bring
about the prompt and thorough
cleanup of a hazardous waste site
... and to recover all costs of reme-
diation expended by the State ... at
that site."37
The letter concluded with a de-
mand that Avondale "submit a
plan for remedial action at the site
... or ... pay to the Secretary the full
costs of a remedial action incurred
by the State."' 38 The Avondale court
held:
We have little trouble view-
ing this administrative pro-
ceeding as a suit. The de-
mand letter commences a
formal proceeding against
Avondale, advising it that a
public authority has assumed
an adversarial posture toward
it, and that disregard of the
DEQ's demands may result
in the loss of substantial
rights by Avondale. These
strike us as the hallmarks of
litigation, and are sufficiently
adversarial to constitute a suit
under New York law and with-
in the meaning ofthe policy.39
A similar result was reached in a
decision from a lower court in New
York. The letter in issue in County
of Niagara v. Fireman's Fund Ins.
Co.40 uses the subjunctive tense in
its introductory sentences, which
in isolation would probably dis-
qualify the letter as a "suit." How-
ever, the subjunctive is followed by
explicitly threatening language.
PRP recipients of the letter are
given sixty days to "submit a good
faith proposal to undertake the
financing of the ... remedial inves-
tigation and feasibility study." 4'
The letter informed the Niagara
BEFORE
BORROWING,
CONSUMERS
SHOULD
INVESTIGATE
LENDERS
Loan fraud is thriving as
more consumers, feeling the
pinch from the recession, are
looking for loans. Consumers
can fall prey to lending com-
panies promising "guaran-
teed loans." A prospective
borrower pays a fee up front
and waits for the proceeds
from her loan. However, the
loan never materializes, and
the unfortunate consumer
never sees the fee she paid.
Consumers can protect
themselves against this kind
of fraud by calling their
state's banking commission.
In addition, consumers can
check with their local Better
Business Bureau.
In many states, the bank-
ing commission has informa-
tion on all kinds of lending
companies, not just banks,
and the commission should
be able to say how many
complaints are outstanding
against a particular lending
institution.
County Refuse Disposal District
that the EPA:
intends to investigate the re-
lease or threatened release of
pollutants and that it may
expend public funds on the
investigation and for any cor-
rective measures which are
necessary to control such re-
lease. The letter also provides
that unless the EPA deter-
mines that responsible par-
ties will properly perform
such action that it will then
do so on its own initiative
pursuant to the authority
vested in it by CERCLA.42
The court held that for "those
insurers whose policies did not
contain a pollution exclusion
clause... an obligation to defend
arose when the PRP letter was
received by the County. '43 Regret-
tably, the judgment in County of
Niagara has not been appealed, so
it is not clear how New York
appellate courts would rule on this
issue.
The court in Ryan v. Royal Ins.
Co. of America44 was presented
with a different issue. After discov-
ering hazardous waste on his prop-
erty which was generated or depos-
ited by a former tenant, Ryan
notified the New York Depart-
ment of Environmental Conserva-
tion ("NYDEC") and received let-
ters requesting Ryan to submit a
closure plan. The property was
subsequently sold, although at a
steep discount because of the
waste. The insurance company re-
fused to reimburse the property
owner for the decrease in the value
of the property and Ryan com-
menced an action for judgment
declaring that it was entitled to a
defense and indemnification from
the insurance company.
The language of the policy and
the government letter were exam-
ined by the court in Ryan. The
court found that the policy express-
ly required the insurer to defend
the insured in respect to "any suit
... seeking damages" and to indem-
nify the insured for amounts the
insured was "legally obligated to
pay. '45 The court noted that no
suit or formal administrative pro-
ceeding existed in the case. The
insured argued, however, that "the
duty to defend arises whenever a
86 Volume 4 Number 3/Spring, 1992
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state agency takes the position that
an environmental condition re-
quires remediation and notifies the
policyholder to that effect."'46 The
court rejected this line of reason-
ing.
The court ruled that the ultimate
issue required an examination of
whether the correspondence Ryan
received from NYDEC constituted
a "suit" sufficient to trigger the
duty to defend under the terms of
the policy. 47 Under this analysis,
Royal had no duty to defend under
the terms of the policy or New
York insurance law. In addition,
Royal had no obligation to indem-
nify because the insured party, nev-
er became "legally obligated to pay
as damages any sums on account of
NYDEC's claim."'48 Hence, there
was no "suit" involved.
It is clear from these cases that
even in those states that recognize
letters as commencing a "suit"
there must be some evidence that
government action is probable and
imminent. In some states, Maine
among them, administrative no-
tice alone does not trigger a duty to
defend. 49
... even in those states
that recognize letters as
commencing a "suit" there
must be some evidence
that government action is
probable and imminent.
While a court's refusal to accept
letters as commencing a "suit" is
understandable in a case such as
Ryan, such a view fails to deal with
a serious problem faced by small
property owners and operators
designated as PRPs which may
affect the cleanup of hazardous
waste sites. If the letter is indefinite
and does not refer to imminent
adverse government action, then
insurers have no incentive to at-
tend any negotiation before a cost
recovery lawsuit. This leaves the
insured with little, if any, guidance.
It compels the insured either to
incur substantial expense for a
declaratory judgment while under
continuing pressure from the gov-
ernment to settle, or to wait for the
inevitable cost recovery action to
commence, by which time the
cleanup costs will have significant-
ly escalated. The pressure on a
PRP is obvious because once the
government announces a finding
of actual release, the PRP is liable
without regard to fault.50 Thus, it is
in a PRP's best interest to respond
positively to avoid the prejudice
that can result in dispositive, extra-
judicial solutions, while the insurer
feigns indifference.
If the letter does not refer to
imminent adverse
government action, then
insurers have no incentive
to attend any negotiation
before a cost recovery
lawsuit.
VI. Allegations Warranting
Coverage
It is a maxim of insurance law
that the duty to defend is greater
than the duty to indemnify. How-
ever, in order to trigger the duty to
defend there must be coverage.
Whether coverage exists is deter-
mined principally by the allega-
tions in the complaint, or, in the
case of government action, in let-
ters. If a complaint or letter can be
fairly read to allege that the "dis-
charge, dispersal, release or es-
cape" is both "sudden" and "acci-
dental" then the insurer has a duty
to defend.
How carefully a complaint must
be drafted is illustrated by one
court's analysis of the word "dis-
posing." Without qualifying
words, an allegation accusing a
party of "disposing" waste "con-
notes a deliberate and intentional
activity" that would not be within
the meaning of the policy. 5' The
same court held: "[W]e decline to
obligate an insurer to extend cover-
age based on a reading of the
complaint that is linguistically con-
ceivable but tortured and unrea-
sonable." 52
Since a plaintiff's characteriza-
tion of the occurrence may be
dispositive, it is important to qual-
ify the charge so that the complaint
can reasonably be read to include
unforeseen accidents or occurr-
ences not deliberately caused by
the insured.53 In Travelers Indem.
Co. v. Dingwell,5 4 plaintiffs alleged
three causes of action, two of
which released the insurer from
any duty to defend. The third cause
read: " 'as a result of negligence ...
products containing [toxic] chemi-
cals permeated the ground to the
ground water table ... resulting in
the contamination of water in the
Plaintiffs' wells.' "55 The court
held that these allegations "do not
necessarily describe a 'deliberate
process' " and, therefore, the com-
plaint triggered the insurer's duty
to defend.5 6
In Technicon Electronics Corp.
v. American Home Assurance
Co.,57 the insured manufacturer
sought judgment against insurance
carriers for a declaration that it
was entitled to defense and indem-
nification for damages claimed by
plaintiffs in an underlying lawsuit
arising out of long-term discharge
of toxic waste chemicals. The court
found that the insurance policy
contained the standard definition
of the word "occurrence" and a
"pollution exclusion" clause that
narrowed the type of event for
which coverage was afforded but
which, in turn, contained an excep-
tion to the exclusion which revived
the coverage if the release or dis-
charge was "sudden and acciden-
tal." 58
The manufacturer conceded
that the discharge of the toxic
waste chemicals was intentional.
However, the manufacturer argued
that because it had not intended to
cause environmental harm or the
specific injury claimed by plain-
tiffs in an underlying lawsuit, the
discharge was accidental. The
court disagreed and held that the
manufacturer's argument failed
"because the pollution exclusion
clause, by its own terms, does not
distinguish between intended or
unintended consequences of inten-
tional discharges; rather, it ex-
cludes from coverage liability
based on all intentional discharges
of waste whether consequential
damages were intended or unin-
tended." 9
VII. Extent Of Coverage
While some jurisdictions limit
their threshold analysis of the com-
plaint to determining whether
(continued on page 88)
Volume 4 Number 3/Spring, 1992 87
CERCLA Claims
(continued from page 87)
there is a duty to defend, others
determine the ultimate question of
whether the insured has coverage,
that is, whether the insurer owes a
duty to indemnify, not simply to
defend. 60 Surprisingly, disagree-
ment about the extent of coverage
revolves around the meaning of
only a few words. By present stan-
dard exclusionary provisions in
CGL policies, insurers have at-
tempted to significantly limit their
liability to defend and indemnify
landowners and operators for re-
sponse and cleanup costs incurred
in complying with CERCLA and
comparable state laws. The reason
for saying that the carriers have
attempted to limit their liability is
because in the tug of war between
insurers and insured parties over
the interpretation of the contract
and exclusionary provisions not all
states agree whether the language is
as narrow as the insurers argue.
... insurers have
attempted to significantly
limit their liability to defend
and indemnify landowners
and operators for response
and cleanup costs...
Key words and phrases, such as
"sudden and accidental," have
been found to have surprising and
subtle, even elusive, elasticity. For
example, the Georgia Supreme
Court, when asked on a certified
question to determine the defini-
tion of "sudden", found that there
were two possible meanings,
"abrupt" and "unexpected and un-
intentional." 6' Wisconsin's highest
court also found the word "sud-
den" ambiguous. 62 Neither court
engaged in a contextual analysis of
the words.
Wisconsin's highest court
found the word "sudden"
ambiguous.
The result is a reading that in-
surance companies probably find
unexpected and disturbing. What
the analysis illustrates is the power
Loyola Consumer Law Reporter
of words to carry multiple mean-
ings. The interpretation of the term
"sudden and accidental" is not
viewed uniformly by all courts.
Some find that the phrase is no
more than a reaffirmance of cover-
age as defined in "occurrence."
Others find that coverage is limited
to discharges and releases that are
both sudden, meaning abrupt and
lasting only a short time, and acci-
dental, meaning unexpected.
"Occurrence" is defined in the
policy as an accident, including
continuous or repeated exposure to
conditions, resulting in bodily in-
jury or property damage neither
expected nor intended by the in-
sured. This wide net of coverage is
itself limited by an exclusion. An
occurrence that would otherwise
be covered but which results in
bodily injury or property damage
resulting from discharge, release or
escape of contaminants or pollut-
ants is not covered unless the dis-
charge, release or escape is sudden
and accidental.
Contemporaneous documents
created by or generated within the
insurance industry prior to the
standard CGL being offered, tend
to support the notion that the
FEDERAL STUDY
OUTLINES FOUR
OPTIONS FOR
WASTE DISPOSAL
The Congressional Budget
office recently completed a
study on the growth of mu-
nicipal solid waste. The study
presents the pros and cons of
four alternative federal strat-
egies for reducing solid waste
on a national level.
The four proposed policies
are: (1) a combination dispos-
al tax and reuse subsidy; (2) a
virgin material tax; (3) an
investment tax credit for re-
cycling; and (4) a recycling
credit system. The 85-page
report is available from the
U.S. Government Printing
Office, Washington, D.C.
20402.
phrase "sudden and accidental"
had a less restrictive meaning and
that strict textual interpretation
has limited it. Of course, courts in
jurisdictions that find the phrase
clear and unambiguous exclude
any consideration of such extrinsic
evidence. Nevertheless, such docu-
ments provide eloquent testimony
that there has been a subtle change
which attempts to balance the in-
terests of the parties.
Damages resulting from inten-
tional and deliberate acts of the
insured are not covered occurr-
ences, while such acts by third
parties are. Discharges and releases
of environmentally harmful wastes
may be covered if they are both
"sudden" and "accidental." Clear-
ly courts have a particular aptitude
for analyzing text and making fine
discriminations. This is part of an
ongoing dialogue between parties
and among judges, the ultimate
purpose of which is to clarify the
meaning of words in a particular
context.
There are situations in which a
court will find no coverage and,
therefore, no duty to defend. 63
Then there are situations where the
courts hold that the "pollution
exclusion" clause is simply a re-
statement of the definition for "oc-
currence.
'64
New York in Technicon Elec-
tronics v. American Home Insur-
ance6 l5 and Massachusetts in Lum-
bermens Mutual Casualty Co. v.
Belleville Industrial, Inc. 66 have de-
termined that the term "sudden
and accidental" is clear and unam-
biguous. The court in Lumbermens
stated:
For the word "sudden" to
have any significant purpose,
and not to be surplusage
when used generally in con-
junction with the word "acci-
dental," it must have a tem-
poral aspect to its meaning,
and not just the sense of
something unexpected.... The
issue is whether the release
was sudden. The alternative
is that it was gradual. If the
release was abrupt and also
accidental, there is coverage
for an occurrence arising out
of the discharge of pollut-
ants. 67
This analysis insists that the word
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"sudden" is not mere surplusage.
A recent case from the United
States Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit agrees that the word
"sudden" is ambiguous and should
be interpreted as meaning "unex-
pected" but suggests that the analy-
sis be refocused. 68 Instead of in-
quiring whether the "damage" was
sudden and accidental, the proper
inquiry should be whether the
"discharge" of the pollutants was
both sudden and accidental. 69 The
case was remanded to the district
court to reconsider its treatment of
the distinction between damages
and discharges.
Courts that have held that the
phrase "sudden and accidental"
has a clear meaning have no prob-
lem in finding coverage where
"discharge" was "unexpected,"
that is, "sudden," but not deliber-
ate, even though the result may be
expected. This interpretation is
wide enough to afford coverage for
acts of vandalism, which are delib-
erate acts by third parties, although
neither expected nor intended by
the insured.
Courts that have held that
the phrase "sudden and
accidental" has a clear
meaning have no problem
in finding coverage where
"discharge" was
"unexpected," that is,
"sudden," but not
deliberate, even though the
result may be expected.
In contrast to courts applying a
contextual analysis are courts that
look at words in isolation. In Just v.
Land Reclamation, Ltd.70, the Wis-
consin Supreme Court held that
the term "sudden" was "reason-
ably susceptible to different mean-
ings and is therefore ambiguous."'7'
The court supported its holding by
reference to two different dictio-
naries and numerous cases from
other jurisdictions.7 2 However, the
finding of ambiguity goes further
than the word, "sudden." The
finding affects the word, "acciden-
tal." According to this interpreta-
tion, the phrase "sudden and acci-
dental" is simply a restatement of
the term "occurrence," which, as
already noted, is a defined term in
the CGL policy. "In other words,
the policy will cover claims where
the injury was 'neither expected
nor intended'."73 By equating the
word "accident" with "occur-
rence" the independent meaning
of "accident" is subverted.
Although the Wisconsin Su-
preme Court's position is comfort-
ing to insured parties there are
problems with its reasoning. The
Wisconsin courts pay less attention
to a distinction which New York
and Massachusetts courts, among
others, make between an active
polluter, that is, one who intends
the act but not the result, and a
non-intentional polluter. This dis-
tinction is brought full circle in
Technicon74, which although it was
decided by New York's highest
court before Just, is not cited by
the Wisconsin Supreme Court.
Plaintiffs in Just75 alleged that
defendant's landfill was the source
of unexpected and unintended pol-
lution which caused them bodily
injury and property damage. The
fact that the damages were the
result of leechate to the groundwa-
ter that was "unexpected" but not
"abrupt" was not a relevant deter-
minant. This is in contrast to other
courts which hold that discharge of
pollutants as an ordinary part of a
company's business operations
cannot be regarded as "sudden and
accidental." 76
VIII. Conflicting Allocations Of The
Burden Of Proof
Federal district courts sitting in
diversity cases are required to ap-
ply state law to insurance issues. If
particular states have reached dif-
ferent results on certain issues,
then a situation may arise in which
a federal court of appeals will be in
the schizophrenic position of hav-
ing to reach one conclusion for
state A and another for state B.
Whether an insurer has the duty
to defend is determined by the
allegations of the complaint or
governmental letter. To prevail,
the insured must show that the
action is arguably or potentially
within the protection purchased.
On the other hand, where the poli-
cy contains an exclusion to cover-
age it is the insurer's burden to
prove that the exclusion is applica-
ble.77 The more contentious issue
is who has the burden of proving
an exception to an exclusion. On
this issue the courts are split. 8
... one state requires the
insured to prove that
discharges are both,
"sudden and accidental,"
and the other state requires
the insurer to prove the
negative.
The Third Circuit includes Del-
aware and Pennsylvania. Under
Delaware law, the insurer has the
burden of proving an exception to
an exclusion, whereas under Penn-
sylvania law, it is the insured who
has the burden. In practical terms,
one state requires the insured to
prove that discharges are both,
"sudden and accidental," and the
other state requires the insurer to
prove the negative. This results in
the same court reaching different
decisions depending upon which
state analysis is applied.7 9
IX. Damages
The remaining term which
causes difficulties is the word
"damages." Damages are not de-
fined in the standard CGL policy.
Definition within a contract is
generally regarded as a way of
limiting meaning. Unless a word is
specifically limited, it is construed
from the point of view of what the
ordinary business person reading
the policy believes it covers. The
United States Court of Appeals for
the Eighth Circuit has held that
CERCLA cleanup costs are not
covered by the CGL.80 Apparently,
the court reached this conclusion
by assuming that the policy would
only be used "by astute insurance
specialists or perspicacious coun-
sel." 8' The court determined that
the term did not include equitable
monetary relief.
In a more recent case decided by
the United States Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia, ap-
plying Missouri law, the court held
that cleanup costs were "dam-
ages."' 82 On the other hand, Maine
(continued on page 90)
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follows the minority view as to the
meaning of "damages. ' 83 Remedi-
al funds "may be substantial and
may effectively alleviate or prevent
property damage to others, but we
do not believe the 'ordinarily intel-
ligent insured,' engaged in a 'more
than casual reading of the policy,'
•. would consider them to be sums
which the insured [is] legally obli-
gated to pay as damages. '84
According to the D.C. Circuit
Court of Appeals, the difference of
interpretation turns on the point of
view which is applied: an expert's
understanding of the term versus a
layperson's understanding. 85 That
court reasoned that a layperson's
understanding of damages would
include cleanup costs. However,
the elusiveness of this distinction is
highlighted by the Maine court's
view that the "ordinarily intelli-
gent insured" would not read the
policy to include cleanup costs as
damages.8 6
When regarded from the point
of view of social policy it is clearer
that the word "damages" should
not be read in any narrow sense. In
the words of one state court: "the
utility of a CGL policy would be
highly dubious if coverage were
allowed to hinge upon whether
plaintiff's complaint was framed in
equity rather than law."'87
X. Conclusion
In all contract disputes parties
contend for different interpreta-
tions of language. Wrong choices
carry the possibility of including
more than the drafter may have
intended. That is why courts, the
final arbiters, spend so much effort
on textual analysis. Words are ca-
pable of carrying a great deal of
meaning. Additional meanings
that spill over, sometimes uninvit-
ed, are made possible by the rich-
ness of language.
In contracts of insurance the
issue of interpretation is sharpened
because the language of the parties'
bargain is not negotiated. Insur-
ance policies are contracts of adhe-
sion. Parties must adhere to the
terms of a standard form on a take
it or leave it basis without negotia-
tion.
When a consumer buys insur-
ance, the consumer would like to
know what the premium buys and
what events or occurrences trigger
the duty to defend and indemnify.
This desire for knowledge will be
the same for the individual con-
sumer who is seeking home protec-
tion as it will be for the largest
corporate consumer who is looking
to protect against the unforeseen
risks of doing business. The stan-
dard form comprehensive general
liability policy came into use sever-
al years before the enactment of
CERCLA, when the dimensions of
the problem and the magnitude of
costs were little understood. Now
that the liabilities and costs are
better understood, insurers are at-
tempting to limit the meaning of
their words.
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MORTGAGE SERVICING FACTS
The Federal Trade Commission has these fast facts on mortgage servicing for
consumers:
Your current servicer usually must notify you at least 15 days before the
effective date of the transfer of your loan servicing.
During a 60-day grace period, you cannot be charged a late fee if you
mistakenly send your mortgage payment to the old servicer and the new servicer
cannot report to a credit bureau that payments were late.
Write to your servicer if you think there are any problems with your account.
Within 60 business days of receiving your inquiry, the servicer must correct
your account or determine it is accurate.
Do not subtract any disputed amount from your mortgage payment. The
servicer may consider this different amount to be partial payment and declare
the mortgage in default.
If you have a complaint, contact your local or state consumer protection
office. If your lender is certified by the Department of Housing and Urban
Development ("HUD"), you may want to file a complaint with HUD. Write:
Office of Single Family Housing, HUD, Room 9282, Washington, D.C. 20410.
You may also want to contact an attorney to advise you of your legal rights.
Under the National Affordable Housing Act, consumers can initiate class action
suits and obtain actual damages, plus additional damages, for a pattern or
practice of noncompliance. In successful actions, consumers also may obtain
court costs and attorneys fees.
